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Recently, the manner in which the United States has entered
into international agreements suggests that our government is more
an aristocracy than a democracy. Webster' defines democracy as
"government by the people"2 and aristocracy as "government by a
noble or privileged class."3 In the last decade the United States has
revised its foreign policy with the Peoples Republic of China
(PRC)4 and Taiwan.' The instrument used to effect these changes
has been neither a treaty nor an executive agreement, but rather an
equally effective document termed a communique.
The United States Constitution requires that international
agreements be made by a treaty which receives Senate approval.
6
Presidents throughout our nation's history,7 however, have circum-
1. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (19th ed. 1974).
2. Id. at 196.
3. Id. at 53.
4. "The United States of America and the Peoples Republic of China ... agreed to
recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979." President
Carter's Address to the Nation, Announcing Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between
the United States and the Peoples Republic of China, December 15, 1978, reprinted in Bu-
REAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SELECTED DOCUMENTS No. 9, U.S. POLICY
TOWARD CHINA, July 15, 1971-January 15, 1979 (1979).
5. Prior to the recognition of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), the United States
recognized the Republic of China (Taiwan) as the legal government of all China. Although
the United Nations excluded the Republic of China from participation in 1971, the United
States continued to advocate the representation of the people of Taiwan in international
agencies with the United Nations and other international institutions. See BUREAU OF PUB-
LIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SELECTED DOCUMENTS No. 9 U.S. POLICY TOWARD
CHINA, July 15, 1971-January 15, 1979 (1979) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTS].
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. James Wilson said at the Pennsylvania ratifying con-
vention, "Neither the President nor the Senate solely, can complete a treaty, they are checks
and balances upon each other and are so balanced as to produce security to the people." 3
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 166-67 (M. Farrand ed. 1937).
7. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 177 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as HENKIN].
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vented this requirement and entered into agreements with foreign
states through an instrument termed an executive agreement. 8
These agreements are executed without Senate approval9 and allow
the Executive to unilaterally create international obligations. In
conducting relations with the PRC, a different form of executive
agreement, namely a communique, has been utilized by the execu-
tive branch to redirect United States-China policy.' 0 In August
1982 President Reagan issued a joint communique" with the PRC
that appears to contradict and amend congressional legislation'2
which controls United States policy toward Taiwan.' 3
This Comment will question whether, absent congressional ap-
proval, President Reagan's communique can constitutionally be
given the legal effect of a treaty or an executive agreement under
international and domestic law. The analysis will begin with an
overview of United States-PRC-Taiwan relations this past decade.
Next, a comparison will be made between President Reagan's com-
munique and the Taiwan Relations Act.' 4 The focus will then nar-
row to an analysis of the executive branch's response to a
congressional inquiry' 5 into the propriety of President Reagan's ac-
tion. This investigation will address the international and domestic
effect of the communique. The Comment will then suggest a need
for judicial review of the communique which should result in nulli-
fying both the international and the domestic legal effect of the
President's action.
I. OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS
A. Presidential Communiques
1. Shanghai Communique. The United States began moving
toward normalization of relations with the PRC when President
Nixon visited Peking in 1972.16 This visit resulted in both countries
8. Id at 176.
9. Id.
10. DOCUMENTS supra note 5.
11. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENCY POLICY No. 413,
U.S.-CHINA JOINT COMMUNIQUE (Aug. 1982) [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMMUNIQUE].
12. The Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C.S. § 3301, Pub. L. No. 96-8 (1979).
13. Id. § 3301(b). For full discussion see infra notes 29-49 and accompanying text.
14. 22 U.S.C.S. § 3301.
15. President Reagan's Communique Hearings on the Separation ofPowers Questions
Raised by the Communique Before the Subcomm. on Separation ofPowers ofthe Senate Judici-
ary Committee (Hearings not in publication at this date) (statement of Davis R. Robinson,
Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, September 27, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
16. DOCUMENTS, supra note 5, at 6.
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reaching an agreement as to the principles of international con-
duct'7 which would govern their future relations. These principles,
termed the basic charter 8 of the new relationship, were encom-
passed in a document called the Shanghai communique.' 9
The major impediment to the normalization of relations was
the country of Taiwan.20 The PRC maintained that Taiwan was a
province of the mainland and that the United States should recog-
nize the PRC as the sole government of all China. E' The United
States, however, maintained that Taiwan was the recognized gov-
ernment of China22 and refused to alter this position. The diver-
gent views inhibited the normalization process with the PRC
through both the Nixon and Ford23 Administrations.
2. President Carter's Communique. In December 1978 Presi-
dent Carter revised United States policy toward the PRC and Tai-
wan. In a communique24 issued jointly with the PRC, the executive
branch agreed to: (1) terminate the mutual defense treaty25 with
Taiwan, (2) recognize the PRC as the sole legal government of
China and derecognize Taiwan, (3) withdraw all United States
troops from Taiwan, and (4) freeze arms sales to Taiwan for one
year.26 This agreement was effected while the Congress was not in
17. Id. at 9.
18. Id. at 11.
19. Id. at 8. President Nixon has stated, "The turning point came at the summit in
February 1972 when the leaders of the Peoples Republic of China and the United States met
and put their personal imprint on a new direction for our two nations, and with it new
contours for the world." PuB. PAPERS 358 (1973).
20. DOCUMENTS, supra note 5, at 7.
21. Id. at 7-8. The Chinese maintained, "The Taiwan question is the crucial question
obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States"; and, "Tai-
wan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland"; and lastly, "the
liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to
interfere." Id.
22. Id.
23. Id at 21-28.
24. Id. at 48. President Carter's communique stated in part, "As of January 1, 1979, the
United States of America recognizes the Peoples Republic of China as the sole legal govern-
ment of China. . . On the same date. . . the United States of America will notify Taiwan
that it is terminating diplomatic relations and that the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
United States and the Republic of China is being terminated.. " Id.
25. Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Repubic of
China, December 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178, 248 U.N.T.S. 213 [hereinafter
cited as Mutual Defense Treaty].
26. DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 48-50. The PRC requested the freeze on the sale of
arms be a permanent one. However, this is one concession President Carter did not agree to.
Rather, as a compromise, he agreed that while the Mutual Defense Treaty followed its one
year expiration clause, the United States would not sell arms to Taiwan. Id.
Vol. 14
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session 27 and without the approval of either the Senate or the
House of Representatives. The Executive's action also ignored a
sense of congressional resolution28 requiring consultation on any
matter affecting the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.
3. The Congressional Response. When Congress reconvened
in January 1979, the reaction was one of outrage. Some legisla-
tors29 attempted to block President Carter's action by bringing
suit.30 However, the Supreme Court considered the matter a polit-
ical question. 3' The result was full implementation of this new
United States policy, and as one legislator32 suggested, "all that
Congress can do is to try and pick up the pieces of our relations
with Taiwan."
One of the major concerns of the Congress was the termination
of the defense treaty with Taiwan. 33 In response, Congress enacted
the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).34  The TRA mandated the fol-
lowing: (1) "it is the policy of the United States to provide Taiwan
27. President Carter's communique was issued on December 15, 1978, while the Con-
gress was in recess for the Christmas holidays.
28. The International Security Assistance Act of 1978, § 26(b). "It is the sense of the
Congress that there should be prior consultation between the Congress and the executive
branch on any proposed policy changes affecting the continuation in force of the Mutual
Defense Treaty of 1954."
29. 125 CONG. REC. H1745 (daily ed. March 28, 1979) (statement of Rep. Zablocki) "It
is bad enough the President would usurp the authority of the Congress-and indeed I believe
he did, and I hope the lawsuit will prove that."
30. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) cert. granted and dismissal of the com-
plaint was directed, without argument. Sen. Goldwater brought this suit against President
Carter for his unilateral action in terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. The
trial court agreed with plaintiff Goldwater that the President did not have the unilateral
authority to terminate the treaty. On appeal the District of Columbia circuit reversed and
found the President did have authority for his actions. The Supreme Court was presented
with the question and vacated the appellate court's decision with directions to remand and
dismiss.
3 1. Id. Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices Rhenquist, Stewart and White, be-
lieved the case presented a political question. One Justice believed the plaintiffs lacked
standing.
32. 125 CONG. REC. H1285 (daily ed. March 13, 1979) (statement of Rep. Duncan)
"Our job is to salvage what we can of our relationship with Taiwan." see also 125 CONG.
REC. HI 156 (daily ed. March 8, 1979) (statement of Rep. Broomfield) "Mr. Chairman, no
amount of soft words, pious hopes or propaganda can remove the stain on American honor
that the President's actions have inflicted. It is left to us to try to salvage what we can."
33. 125 CONG. REC. H1741 (daily ed. March 28, 1979) (statement of Rep. Zablocki)
"As members will recall, the basic purpose of the legislation... is to establish a peace and
security framework . . . for Taiwan."
34. 22 U.S.C.S. § 3301.
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with arms of a defensive character,"35 and (2) "the United States
will make such defensive articles and services36 in such quantity as
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self de-
fense."37 In an attempt to prohibit future unilateral executive ac-
tion, the TRA also mandates that determinations regarding the sale
of arms to Taiwan be made jointly3" by the President and Congress.
The majority of legislators believed that the TRA was a clear
message of congressional dissatisfaction with President Carter's ac-
tion.39 However, there were some40 who felt that the legislation im-
pliedly gave congressional approval to the President's
communique. Specifically, they did not believe that the President
had the unilateral authority to terminate a treaty4' or to regulate
foreign commerce.42 They felt that the legislation not only con-
doned the President's action, but was also another example of con-
gressional acquiescence 43 to Executive prerogative. Considering
the recent action by President Reagan, this concern was apparently
not unfounded.
4. President Reagan's Communique. On August 17, 1982,
President Reagan issued another joint communique with the
PRC.44 This communique set forth United States policy which ap-
pears contrary to the policy mandated by the TRA. According to
the communique, the United States does not seek to carry out a
policy of long term arms sales to Taiwan, but rather intends to
gradually reduce those sales. The communique further resolves that
35. Id. at § 3301(b)(5).
36. Id. at § 3302(a).
37. Id.
38. Id. at § 3302(b).
39. 125 CONG. REC. H1744-45 (daily ed. March 28, 1979) (statement of Rep. Fountain)
"This legislation is seen by the President and his advisers as a forthright and compelling
response by the Congress to his ill-advised single handed recognition of Red China."
40. 125 CONG REC. S2325 (daily ed. March 8, 1979) (statement of Sen. Humphrey) "I
would like the security section even stronger. All that is being attempted here is to firm up
some wobly [sic] gums ... so that in the future we cannot so readily speak out of both sides
of our mouths on this sort of issue."
41. See supra note 30.
42. 125 CONG REC. H 1179 (daily ed. March 8, 1979) (statement of Rep. Edwards)
"[Tihe President is another branch of government. He is an equal branch of government and
I do not want us to continue to proceed on the assumption that it is the responsibility of this
House to abdicate its responsibilities in the international affairs of this country."
43. 125 CONG. REC. H1742 (daily ed. March 28, 1979) (statement of Rep. Bauman)
"Mr. Speaker, some of us have a strong feeling that they do not wish to be a party to any
legislation that terminates our diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China on Taiwan."
44. JOINT COMMUNIQUE, supra note 11.
Vol. 14
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the quantity and quality of arms will not exceed the nature and
number of arms sold to Taiwan in the previous year. 5
These policy statements do not correspond with the language
or policy of the TRA. The Act states that ". . . it is the policy of
the United States to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive char-
acter."'46 This language does not suggest any limitations or reduc-
tion in the arms to be sold. Adding to the dilemma, the TRA
specifically requires ". . the President and the Congress"47 to
jointly determine the nature and quantity of arms to be provided.
However, President Reagan, like President Carter, appears to have
issued his communique without prior congressional consultation.
These contradictions have resulted in congressional inquiry48
regarding the Executive's authority for such unilateral action. Two
difficulties arise as a result of President Reagan's action. First,
should a communique be afforded the status of an international
agreement upon which a foreign state can rely? Second, will a
communique be afforded supremacy"9 where it is inconsistent with
prior legislation? To answer these questions, the analysis will now
focus on the international and domestic legal effect of President
Reagan's communique.
45. Id. at sec. 6. The communique formally states:
Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Govern-
ment states that it does not seek to carry out a long term policy of arms sales to
Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in
quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it in-
tends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time
to a final resolution.
46. 22 U.S.C.S. § 3301(b)(5).
47. Id. at § 3302(b). "The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and
quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs
of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determinations of Tai-
wan's defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection
with recommendations to the President and the Congress." Id
48. Hearings, supra note 15.
49. U.S. CONST. art. V1, cl. 2. Under United States law, the last in time takes priority
over previous inconsistent law. This "supremacy" is usually afforded to treaties and execu-
tive agreements. However, considering the ability of President Carter's communique to
supercede the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, communiques may have the status of
treaties or executive agreements.
6
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL EFFECT
A. External View-The International Court of Justice
50
Perspective
The first position maintained by the executive branch is that
the communique ". . . is not an international agreement and thus
imposes no obligations on either party under international law."'"
To support this position, the Legal Adviser52 states that the com-
munique does nothing more than "set forth parallel and interre-
lated statements of policy by the United States and China."53 If the
executive branch is suggesting by this remark that presidential
statements of policy have little effect on United States foreign rela-
tions, this is a difficult concept to accept. From the perspective of
international law, the position is less than persuasive.
An international tribunal54 has addressed the legal effect to be
given statements made by officers of foreign states. The case con-
cerned the legal status of Eastern Greenland.55 The dispute was
between Norway and Denmark concerning which state controlled a
portion of Greenland. The Norwegian government proclaimed
that it occupied certain territories in Greenland which the Danish
government contended were subject to the sovereignty of Den-
mark.56 The Danish government supported this contention by ar-
guing that Norway had recognized Danish sovereignty over this
part of Greenland and therefore could not dispute it.57 As evi-
dence, the Danes offered a declaration by the Norwegian Minister
for Foreign Affairs.58 The Minister's statement was made in re-
sponse to the Danish government's request that Norway not inter-
fere with Denmark's claim over this area of Greenland.59 The
Norwegian Minister stated that "The Norwegian government
50. The International Court of Justice was brought into being by the Charter of the
United Nations on June 26, 1945. Prior to this, from 1920 until 1945, the tribunal was known
as the Permanent Court of International Justice. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 54 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited
as SWEENEY, OLIVER & LEECH].
51. Hearings, supra note 15.
52. Id
53. Id
54. The Permanent Court of International Justice.
55. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 43 at
35 (judgment of April 5, 1933).
56. Id. at 42.
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would not make any difficulties in the settlement of this ques-
tion."6 The Government of Norway contended that the statement
was in verbal form and that the Minister was not competent to bind
the State internationally.6'
The question before the court was whether authorized discus-
sions and statements made by foreign ministers would be binding
on their respective States. The court found that "[i]t is beyond all
dispute that a reply of this nature given by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs ...in regard to a question within his province is binding
upon the country to which the Minister belongs."62
Applying the rationale of the International Court of Justice
(I.C.J.) to President Reagan's communique would suggest that a
statement by the President of the United States should have an
equal or greater status than one made by a foreign minister. To
consider an officially documented communique63 issued by the
President as inferior to that of a statement by a foreign minister
would be inappropriate. Therefore, although the I.C.J. is not
bound by stare decisis,4 and notwithstanding the Connolly reserva-
tion,65 this court would be hard pressed to find President Reagan's
communique not a legally binding international agreement.
B. Internal View-The Department of State's Position
Further supporting the view that the President's communique
is an international agreement is the following position of the
United States Department of State. The United States and Vene-
60. Id
61. Id. at 52.
62. Id. at 71.
63. See supra note 11.
64. The Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38 provides:
1. This Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.
2. This privision shall not prejudice the power of the court to decide a case ex
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
65. The reservation states: "Jurisdicition will not apply to disputes with regard to mat-
ters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdicition of the United States." (This reser-
vation allows the United States to unilaterally determine if it will accept the jurisdiction of
the I.C.J.). See SWEENEY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra note 50, at 739.
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zuela made an agreement, by way of protocol,6 6 whereby Vene-
zuela agreed to pay $470,000.00 to the United States in settlement
of a claim.6 7 After the agreement was made, a new government
council in Venezuela came into existence. There was concern in
the embassy that this new council would have to reapprove the pro-
tocol.68 When notified of this concern the Department of State
took the following position: "Protocol isfait accompli, internation-
ally speaking ...upon those assurances (protocol) this govern-
ment is, internationally speaking, entitled to rely ...
If the State Department considers a memorandum such as pro-
tocol to be legally binding at the international level, then a commu-
nique issued jointly by the Executive and a foreign state should be
afforded the same status. Therefore, considering the Denmark v.
Norway decision70 and our own State Department's view, 71 it is dif-
ficult to consider President Reagan's communique as anything less
than an international agreement creating the attendant obligations.
Internationally speaking, these obligations would entitle the PRC
to rely on President Reagan's amendments 72 to the TRA.
C Exception to the Creation of International Obligations
There is one caveat nullifying the effect of an international
agreement. This exception may be afforded if the agreement can be
found to violate an internal law of the consorting state. 73 Although
there is conflict over this issue,74 the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties has attempted to resolve the question.
It should be noted that the Vienna Convention 75 does not dif-
66. "A preliminary memorandum of diplomatic negotiation." THE MERRIAM-WEB-
STER DICTIONARY 559 (19th ed. 1974).
67. 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (1943) [hereinafter cited as
HACKWORTH].
68. Id at 157.
69. Id
70. See Denmark v. Norway, supra note 55.
71. See HACKWORTH, supra note 67.
72. See supra notes 45-48.
73. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, § 2, art. 46, openedfor signature May 23,
1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27. [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention] "A violation is
manifest if it would be objectively evident to any state conducting itself in the matter in
accordance with normal practice and good faith." (The Convention entered into force on
Jan. 27, 1980; the United States has signed the convention, but as of this date has not ratified
the Convention on Treaties.)
74. Fairman, Competence to Bind the State to an International Agreement, 30 AM. J.
INT'L L. 439 (1936).
75. See Vienna Convention, supra note 73.
Vol. 14334
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ferentiate between treaties and other forms of international com-
mitments, but rather consolidates both into the term "international
agreements."76 Since President Reagan's communique is arguably
an international agreement, the Convention's exception would be
applicable. Supporting this view is the Restatement of Foreign Re-
lations' position.77 The Restatement considers the President's state-
ments to be legally binding upon the United States under
international law, but from a domestic view, would permit the ex-
ception to apply.
The Vienna Convention would obligate a state to comply with
the agreement unless the internal constitutional violation it created
was manifest and the internal rule was of fundamental impor-
tance.7 8 However, what constitutes a manifest and fundamentally
important violation is not clear. One position79 is that the United
States Constitution requires Senate approval of international agree-
ments, such as treaties, and any agreement which lacks Senate ap-
proval is fundamentally deficient.8" Negating this contention8 are
the many international agreements made and constitutionally sup-
ported without Senate approval.82 The suggestion is that the im-
portance of senatorial approval is questionable and apparently not
a manifest violation since many international agreements are effec-
tive without that approval.
Assuming the latter argument more persuasive, it would ap-
pear that President Reagan's communique would be considered
binding under international law. However, if it can be shown that
the President's action resulted in a failure to uphold a law of the
land, specifically the TRA, then it might be considered a manifest
and fundamental constitutional violation.83 To investigate this
contention, the domestic legality of President Reagan's communi-
que requires analysis.
76. Id.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 130-131 (1965).
78. See Vienna Convention, supra note 73.
79. Fairman, supra note 74.
80. Id. at 439.
81. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 427.
82. Id.
83. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, "This Constitution and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made. ..
shall be the supreme law of the land."
10
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III. THE DOMESTIC LEGAL EFFECT
A. Communiques Compared with Executive Agreements
From an international perspective, a communique is capable
of effecting an international agreement. However, from a domestic
view, the United States generally utilizes treaties or executive
agreements 84 to create international commitments. Therefore,
before an analysis of a communique's domestic legal effect can be
undertaken, a communique must be shown to compare with the
force and effect of an executive agreement.
One usual method of comparison is by definition. The defini-
tion of an executive agreement however, is less than clear. The
State Department, when asked to define the difference8" between an
executive agreement and a treaty, offered the following explana-
tion: "A treaty is something we have to send over to the Senate, an
executive agreement we don't have to send over."86
The difference between an executive agreement and a commu-
nique is equally vague. Considering the elements of a communique
and an executive agreement, however, reveals similarities. An ex-
ecutive agreement appears to be: (1) a statement by the executive
branch; (2) directing a course of action the United States intends to
pursue; (3) communicated to a foreign state, either written or oral;
8 7
and (4) executed with prior, subsequent or no congressional ap-
proval. 88 The components of President Reagan's communique ap-
pear to satisfy these elements. Specifically, it was: (1) a statement
made to the PRC, (2) stating the arms sales policy of the United
States and Taiwan, (3) jointly issued by the United States and the
PRC, (4) without congressional approval.89
Additionally, past communiques9" issued by the United States
and the PRC have had the force and effect of an executive agree-
ment. For example, President Nixon's communique91 was consid-
84. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 173.
85. A. SCHLESINGER JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 69 (1973) [hereinafter cited as IM-
PERIAL PRESIDENCY].
86. Id.
87. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 184.
88. Id. at 174.
89. Hearings, supra note 15. (Statement of Harold C. Hinton, Professor of Political Sci-
ence and International Affairs, The George Washington Univeristy, Washington, D.C., Sept.
17, 1982).
90. See supra note 23.
91. DOCUMENTS, supra note 5, at 37.
Vol. 14
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ered to be binding policy which the United States would follow.92
President Carter's communique had the power to "derecognize" a
country and terminate a treaty which substantively changed United
States law.93 To consider President Reagan's communique as less
forceful is difficult to support. Accordingly, for purposes of this
analysis, communiques and executive agreements will be consid-
ered synonomous.
B. Executive Agreement-An Overview
1. Historical Perspective. In 1789 President Washington went
to the Senate to discuss a proposed treaty.94 After a lengthy debate
that focused on Senate procedures rather than the treaty, Washing-
ton is said to have left the Senate declaring that ". . . he would be
damned if he ever went there again."95 As a result, Presidents from
Washington to Reagan9 6 have circumvented senatorial participa-
tion in international affairs.97 The instrument most often utilized
has been the executive agreement. The growth9 8 in the number of
executive agreements has resulted in their being referred to as "a
sorcerer's apprentice" 99 and "the instrument for major interna-
tional commitments." '1'
2. Constitutional Authori for Executive Agreements. Article
II of the Constitution confers on the Executive the power to make
treaties, provided that two-thirds of the Senate present concur.' 0
However, the Constitution is silent regarding executive agreements.
The Constitution does give the Executive unilateral authority as
Commander in Chief'0 2 and the authority to receive ambassadors
92. Id
93. See Mutual Defense Treaty, supra note 25.
94. II. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 150 (1963), reprinted in SWEENEY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra
note 50, at 1040.
95. Id
96. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 177.
97. Id.
98. IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 85, at 313.
99, Id "We are not put in the Senate," said Senator Case, "to deal only with treaties on
copyrights, extradition, stamp collections, and minor questions of protocol. If that is the
meaning of the Constitution, then I think the Founding Fathers wasted their time."
100. Id. According to the State Department as of January 1, 1982, the United States had
entered into international commitments through 983 treaties and 6,371 executive agreements.
Telephone interview with Ann Simmons, U.S. Dep't of State (Jan. 6, 1983.)
101. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
102. Id. at cl. I.
12
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and other public ministers.° 3 This authority has been extended by
implication"° to give the Executive the power to formally recog-
nize '05 a foreign state. These powers, combined with the general
powers which the Executive derives from Article I, form the basis
for the constitutional validity of executive agreements. The result
has been what one writer 0 6 has termed "an invitation to struggle
for the privilege of directing American foreign policy"'0 7 between
the Executive and Congress.
3. Types of Executive Agreements and their Judicial Support.
Generally, two' 0 8 and sometimes three'0 9 types of executive agree-
ments have been recognized. They have been categorized as: (1)
congressional-executive agreements having the prior approval of
Congress,"0 (2) agreements made unilaterally by the President
which receive subsequent congressional approval,"' and (3) sole-
executive agreements which receive neither prior nor subsequent
approval by Congress." 12
Executive agreements said to have prior congressional ap-
proval usually find authority through the express or implied lan-
guage of a statute.' For example, in United States v. Curtis-
Wright Export Corp.,"4 the Supreme Court upheld an executive
agreement prohibiting the sale of arms to Bolivia and Paraguay." I
5
Prior to this executive proclamation, Congress had passed a joint
resolution authorizing presidential discretion to take this type of
action." 6 Defendant Curtis-Wright argued that this delegation of
foreign commerce power to the President was unconstitutional.'
17
103. Id at cl. 2.
104. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 168.
105. Id; see also IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 85, at 14.
106, E.S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, reprinted in IMPE-
RIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 85, at 7.
107. IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 85, at 7.
108. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 173-176.
109. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 94, at 150.
110. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 173.
111. Id. at 174.
112. Id.
113. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 173-176.
114. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
115. Id. at 312-13.
116. Id at 304. The resolution provided in part: "That if the President finds that the
prohibition of the sale of arms . . .may contribute to the reestablishment of peace . . . it
shall be unlawful to sell . any arms . . . until otherwise ordered by the President or the
Congress."
117. Id. at 315.
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The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument and found
that legislation in foreign affairs "must often accord to the Presi-
dent a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone in-
volved.""' 8 The Court, in dictum, also suggested that even absent
an Act of Congress, the President would still have constitutional
authority for this executive agreement. 1 9 The apparent source of
this authority lies within the exclusive power of the President as the
"sole-organ" of the government in the field of foreign relations. 2 °
Executive agreements enacted solely by the President, without
-prior or subsequent congressional approval, have also received ju-
dicial support. In United States v. Belmont,'2 the Supreme Court
upheld such an agreement between the United States and the So-
viet Union. Through an exchange of a diplomatic correspondence
called the Litvinov Agreement,122 the Soviet Union had assigned to
the United States government all accounts due the Soviets from
American nationals. 123 The Soviets had acquired these accounts as
a result of the nationalization of their government. 124 The defend-
ant argued that the actions of the United States government were
confiscatory and against the policy of the State of New York.
125
The Court took judicial notice that the agreement was coincidental
with the recognition and establishment of normal relations with the
Soviet Union.' 26 Echoing the "sole-organ" prerogative of the Presi-
dent,'27 the Court then found that while "a treaty signified a com-
pact made between two or more independent nations, there are
international compacts which are not treaties and do not require
the participation of the Senate."' 28 The Court suggested that exam-
ples of such compacts would be protocols, modus vivendi. postal
conventions, and agreements such as the one under
consideration. 1
29
118. Id. at 320.
119. Id
120. Id. at 319.
121. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
122. Id. at 326.
123. Id
124. Id at 327.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 330.
127. Id. at 331.
128. Id.
129. Id Justice Sutherland also stated "that the negotiations, acceptance of the assign-
ment and agreements and understandings in respect thereof were within the competence of
the President may not be doubted." Id.
14
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Five years later in United States v. Pink,3 ° the Supreme Court
was again presented with the question of the propriety of the Litvi-
nov Agreement. Although now a revamped Court, 3 ' the decision
was identical to the one in Belmont. 32 Again the defendant's argu-
ment was that the agreement was confiscatory and contrary to state
law. ' 33 The Court reiterated the ability of an executive agreement
to have supremacy over state law. 3 4 Quoting the Federalist No.
64; 13  Article II, clause 2 (the Supremacy Clause);1 36 and Bel-
mont,137 the Court held that: "All constitutional acts of power,
whether in the Executive or in the Judicial department, have as
much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the
Legislature."'' 38 Emphasizing the point, the Court also noted that:
"State law must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs the
policy or provisions of, a treaty or of an international compact or
agreement."' 139 The Court was also careful to note ". . . that even
treaties cannot derogate the authority of the states . .. unless
clearly necessary to effectuate national policy.'
' 40
Although Belmont14 ' and Pink142 support the validity of execu-
tive agreements taking precedence over state law, neither decision
suggests that executive agreements would take precedence over fed-
eral law. 143 It is worthy to note that both Courts found an execu-
tive agreement to have the supremacy status of a treaty in certain
instances. Specifically, it was held that the last in time controls over
130. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
131. Justice Sutherland was no longer sitting on the Court. Professor Henkin, speaking
of the Justice, has said, "there are agreements the President can make on his own authority
and others he cannot, but neither Justice Sutherland or anyone else has told us which are
which." HENKIN supra note 7 at 179. See also Imperial Presidency, supra note 25, at 103
quoting Professor Powell of Harvard Law School speaking to his students: "just because
Justice Sutherland writes clearly, you must not suppose he thinks clearly."
132. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
133. 315 U.S. 203, 214 (1942).
134. Id at 215.
135. Id at 230.
136. Id U.S. CONsT\art VI, cl. 2. "This Constitution and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
137. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
138. 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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prior inconsistent law."'
The Supreme Court has attempted to restrict the power of ex-
ecutive agreements on certain occasions. One case restricting the
power of an executive agreement is Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co.
v. Sawyer.'45 In Youngstown, the President was concerned that a
strike by steel workers would hamper United States interests in pro-
tecting South Korea.'" As a result, he attempted to proclaim a
military takeover of the steel plants. 47 The question before the
Court was whether the President, acting in the foreign-affairs inter-
ests of the United States, could order a military takeover of steel
plants, thereby contravening prior legislation.' 48  The Supreme
Court found that the Executive has: "neither explicit nor inherent
power to set aside an Act of Congress for the benefit of the United
States foreign-affairs interests as seen by the President."'
149
Youngstown has caused some' 50 to question whether Pink has
survived this decision.15 Although the issue is blurred, the concur-
ring opinion'52 in Youngstown has received praise for its analysis of
the levels of Executive power vis-a-vis the power of Congress. The
opinion suggested that the maximum level of Executive power is
found when it is exercised by the express or implied will of the
Congress. 153 The next level is a middle ground or "zone of twi-
light" ' 5 4 where the Executive and the Congress may have concur-
rent power or in which the distinction is uncertain. 155 The "lowest
ebb"' 56 of Executive power is when it is in contradiction or conflict
with the will of the Congress.
These categories are applicable to the cases previously dis-
i44. Id at 230 (quoting The Federalist No. 64).
.145. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
146. Id. at 583.
147. Id.
148. Id at 586. (The legislation referred to in the decision was the Taft-Hartley Act in
which Congress refused to adopt a seizure method for settling labor disputes. The result was
the Court noting specifically that the Congress did not provide for seizure under any
circumstances).
149. Id. at 588.
150. SWEENEY, OLIVER, & LEECH, supra note 50, at 1055.
151. Id The authors suggest that the Supreme Court has not subsequently addressed the
issue of whether executive agreements may supercede state legislation even if such action
may not supercede Federal legislation. But see Dames & Moore v. Regan and Weinberger v.
Ross infra notes 169-203 and accompanying text.
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cussed. For example, Curtis- Wright'57 would be consistent with the
first level of Executive power. Both Belmont158 and Pink159 would
arguably fall within the "zone of twilight"16 ' and concurrent au-
thority. The Youngstown' 6' decision would be a demonstration of
the "lowest ebb"' 62 of the Executive's power. However, which cate-
gory Executive action may fall into is not always clear. For in-
stance, whether a President has acted with the implied will of
Congress, through statutory vagueness or in contravention of Con-
gressional policy, is difficult to ascertain. President Reagan's com-
munique poses such a dilemma.
C. President Reagan's Communique
1. The Executive's Position. In defense of the President's ac-
tion, the executive branch 63 maintains that the communique's
".. . status under domestic law is that of a statement by the Presi-
dent of a policy which he intends to pursue."' 164  When ques-
tioned 65 about the TRA joint decision-making requirement, the
executive branch acknowledged that the TRA does provide "that
determinations with respect to . . .defensive articles . . . be made
by the President and Congress in accordance with procedures es-
tablished by law."' 16 6 However, the executive branch also noted
that "the TRA itself specifies no procedures for joint action by the
Congress and the President."'
167
One inference to be drawn from this statement is that the Pres-
ident intends to comply with relevant laws, but since the TRA is
procedurally silent on joint action, Executive discretion may be im-
plied. The executive branch can point to recent Supreme Court de-
cisions 168 which support this contention.
In Dames & Moore v. Reagan169 the dispute questioned the Ex-
157. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
158. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
159. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
160. 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 637.
163. Hearings, supra note 15.
164. Id.
165. Id. The Legal Adviser was responding to letters sent by the Congress to the Depart-




168. See infra notes 169-203 and accompanying text.
169. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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ecutive's power to settle unilaterally claims between United States
nationals and a foreign state.'7 ° The case involved the settlement
of claims, by executive agreement, arising out of the Iranian hos-
tage' 71 situation. As part of the settlement, the executive branch
agreed to suspend claims against Iran in American courts and have
the matters resolved through arbitration. 72 Dames & Moore al-
leged that the Executive's action exceeded his constitutional powers
and that the executive agreement did not comport with legislation
which addressed this issue.
17 3
The Supreme Court found that, although not specifically au-
thorized by Congress, the President did have the power to suspend
the claims. 7 a Relying on Pink175 and enlarging the categories of
Executive power suggested in Youngstown, 76 the Court found that
the previous legislation indicated a congressional willingness "...
to implicitly allow for broad Executive discretion"' 177 in certain ar-
eas of foreign relations. The Court expanded Youngstown178 by
finding that Executive authority does not fit ". . . neatly into one of
three pigeonholes, but rather, at some point along a spectrum run-
ning from explicit congressional authorization to explicit
prohibition."' 79
The interesting aspect of this decision is the Court's expansion
of the Youngstown doctrine.1 0 There is arguably no longer a mid-
dle ground "zone of twilight,"'' but rather a continuing twilight
between explicit prohibition and approval. Applying this rationale
to President Reagan's communique would suggest that since the
TRA is silent on joint determination procedures there is not explicit
congressional prohibition. Therefore, absent prohibition, presiden-
tial discretion would be implied.
Another decision supporting liberal interpretation of a statute
170. Id.
171. Id. The government of Iran seized the American Embassy in Tehran on November
4, 1979, and held the personnel hostage until a release was negotiated on January 19, 1981.
172. Exec. Order Nos. 12,276-12,284, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-30 (1981). (These orders were
issued by President Carter and endorsed by President Reagan on January 20, 1982).
173. 453 U.S. 654, 655-66 (1981).
174. Id. at 669-70.
175. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
176. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
177. 453 U.S. 654, 677 (1981).
178. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
179. 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981).
180. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
181. Id. at 635.
18
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is Weinberger v. Rossi.18 2 Prior to the suit, Congress had enacted
legislation which prohibited discrimination, in favor of local na-
tionals, in hiring preference at overseas military installations.
18 3
The one exception to this statute was that provisions in a treaty
would allow preference to be given to local nationals. 8 a At the
time of enactment, there were thirteen executive agreements in ef-
fect which required that preference be given to local citizens over
United States citizens.'85 After the statute 8 6 took effect, four more
executive agreements were made which again gave preference to
the local citizens. 187 None of these executive agreements were sub-
mitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. 188
In 1978, United States citizens working at the naval facility at
Subic Bay in the Phillipines were notified that their jobs were being
taken by local nationals in accordance with an executive agreement
known as the Base Labor Agreement (BLA). 189  This agreement
was in force prior to the enactment of the above-mentioned statute.
The argument presented to the Supreme Court was, inter alia, that
the BLA violated the statute. At issue was whether an executive
agreement would be considered a treaty and would thereby fall
within the exception provided in the statute. 190
The Court, in a footnote, discussed how the Executive may
enter into certain binding agreements with foreign nations without
complying with the Treaty clause 19' of the Constitution. In sup-
port, the Court noted Dames & Moore,9 2 Pink,
19 3 and Belmont 194
The Court also stated that Congress has not been consistent in dis-
182. 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
183. 5 U.S.C. § 7201 (1976 ed. Supp. III).
184. Id.
185. 456 U.S. 25, 31 (1982).
186. 5 U.S.C. § 7201 (1976 ed. Supp. III).
187. 456 U.S. 25, 31 (1982).
188. Id. at 32. The Court strongly emphasized that if Congress had not intended for the
word "treaty" to include executive agreements then they would have opposed these agree-
ments effected after the statute was enacted.
189. Id at 28. The Base Labor Agreement, inter alia, provides for the preferential hiring
of Filipino citizens at United States facilities in the Phillipines.
190. Id The Court noted that simply because the question presented is entirely one of
statutory construction does not mean that the question necessarily admits of an easy answer.
(Quoting Chief Justice Marshall who long ago observed: "[Wihere the mind labors to dis-
cover the design of the Legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived .
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805)).
191. Id. at 29.
192. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
193. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
194. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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tinguishing between Article II treaties,'95 and other international
agreements made by the President.' 96 Additionally, notice was
taken of the four executive agreements effected after enactment of
the statute197 which were not challenged by the Congress. 198 As a
result, the Court inferred that the Congress intended the word
"treaty," as used in the legislation, to include an executive
agreement. 99
The Supreme Court acknowledged the lower court's reliance
on legislative history which indicated a disfavor of executive agree-
ments requiring preferential hiring.2" However, this "history" was
discarded as being out of context and too isolated a remark to indi-
cate true legislative intent.20  As a result, the Court held that: "the
treaty exception in the statute extends to executive agreements as
well as Article II treaties.
20 2
When Dames & Moore2" 3 and Weinberger"° are considered to-
gether in relation to President Reagan's communique, the repercus-
sions of the President's action begin to surface. Under Dames &
Moore,2 °5 the communique would arguably fall within a "new"
grey area since procedures for joint decision making were not speci-
fied in the TRA. Weinberger'° would suggest that the communi-
que, as an executive agreement, should be given treaty status under
domestic United States law. The implication would be that Presi-
dent Reagan's communique has created international obligations
207
and has amended substantive United States law.20 8 Whether the
Framers209 of the Constitution intended the Executive to have such
sweeping unilateral authority is questionable.
195. 456 U.S. 25, 30 (1982).
196. Id.
197. Id at 31.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 33.
201. Id. The Court noted the remark of Senator Hughes. Specifically, the dependents of
unlisted personnel are denied the opportunity to work at overseas bases, by agreement with
the country in which they are located, and are forced to live in poverty. The Court found
that this statement was made after remarks regarding NATO agreements and believed that
taken in context it did not apply to the agreement at issue.
202. Id at 35.
203. 453 U.S. 654(1981).
204. 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
205. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
206. 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
207. See supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
209. IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 85, at 279. "The Founding Fathers were deter-
20
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2. The Congressional Position. The strongest language re-
stricting the power of the Executive can be found in United States v.
Guy W Capps, Inc. 21° In Capps, the executive branch entered into
an agreement with Canada regulating the importation of certain
produce into the United States. 2 ' However, this agreement was in
contravention of previous legislation, the Agricultural Act of
1948.212 Defendant Capps violated the terms of the executive
agreement. The trial court held for the defendant on the ground
there had not been a sufficient showing of breach of contract or
damages to the United States. 21 3 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
214
affirmed, but on different grounds. The appellate court held:
"whatever the power of the Executive absent congressional action,
the Executive, through an executive agreement, cannot avoid com-
plying with previous congressional legislation.' 21 5 The court stated
that, ". . . while the President has certain inherent powers under
the Constitution . . .the power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce is not among the powers incident to the presidential of-
fice, but is expressly vested by the Constitution in the Congress."2 6
The Supreme Court decided Capps2 7 three years after its deci-
sion in Youngstown.21 8 Capps provided the opportunity to settle the
question as to whether an executive agreement would have
supremacy over a prior inconsistent federal law. The Court af-
firmed the appellate court's decision, but on the trial court's
grounds of insufficient showing of damages.219 In so doing, the
Supreme Court made suspect the appellate court's decision, which
has resulted in criticism of the Fourth District's holding. 220 How-
ever, Capps is useful for fostering the constitutional principle that
Congress has the plenary power to regulate foreign commerce.
This commerce power is the strong suit of Congress in any attempt
to restrict Executive power.
mined to insure that no one man," in Lincoln's phrase, "should hold the power of bringing
this oppression upon us."
210. 204 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1953), afl'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
211. 204 F.2d 655, 657 (4th Cir. 1953).
212. Id
213. Id at 655.
214. Id. at 661.
215. Id. at 659, 660.
216. Id.
217. 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
218. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
219. 348 U.S. 296, 302 (1955).
220. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 181.
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President Reagan's communique appears to limit arms sales to
a foreign country and thereby regulate foreign commerce. Al-
though there are areas221 in which the Congress has delegated com-
merce authority to the President, the TRA does not do so.222 This
recent action by the President is difficult to align with previous ex-
ecutive agreements which have received judicial support.223
When the cases supporting executive agreements are compared
with the communique, the President's action has arguably exceeded
his constitutional powers. These cases suggest that the following
types of executive agreements are permissible. First, agreements
executed with prior congressional approval, such as Curtis-
Wright, 224 in which Congress gave the President discretion to con-
trol arms sales would be within the Executive's authority.225 Sec-
ond, agreements which do not have domestic effect, but rather
address external international situations would be allowable. Ex-
amples of this type would be Belmont22 6 and Pink,227 which did not
have a deleterious effect on United States citizens.228 Additionally,
as noted previously, the Pink court placed emphasis on the agree-
ment's relation to the formal recognition of the Soviet government.
Finally, executive agreements executed under exigent circum-
stances, such as Dames & Moore,2 29 would be within the authority
of the Executive. Although the Dames & Moore court liberally con-
strued two statutes, 230 given the sensitive nature of the Iranian situ-
ation the statutory interpretation becomes more understandable.
These decisions, however, cannot be aligned with President
Reagan's action. First, the TRA does not allow for Executive dis-
cretion as did the legislation questioned in Curtis- Wright.21' Sec-
221. Id at 182, 183.
222. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
223. See e.g. Curtis-Wright, Belmont, Pink, and Dames & Moore, supra notes 130-203
and accompanying text.
224. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
225. Id. at 305.
226. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
227. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
228. Id. In Belmont, all United States citizens had received full payment on their ac-
counts. In Pink, the litigant was an Insurance Company with foreign creditors.
229. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
230. Id; see International Emergency Economic Power Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701-1706 (1976,
Supp. I 1978 & Supp. IV 1980). The President's authority, "may be exercised to deal with
any unusual and extraordinary threat which has its source in whole or substantial part
outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat."
231. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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ond, the incidental-to-recognition concept suggested in Pink3 2
would not apply, since this agreement was effected three years after
the formal recognition of the PRC. Finally, the exigent circum-
stances, as in Dames & Moore,233 are not present.
The President's communique, in contrast, is analogous to exec-
utive agreements which have been nullified by the judicial branch.
Decisions such as Youngstown 234 and Capps2 35 suggest that when an
executive agreement attempts to override a statute, courts will not
look favorably on this type of Executive action. Although a line
has not been clearly drawn, given the language and legislative his-
tory of the TRA, this communique appears to have resulted in an
abuse of Executive privilege.
IV. CONCLUSION
The past ten years have witnessed a revision in United States
policy toward the PRC and Taiwan. International obligations have
been created and nullified, not by treaty or executive agreement,
but rather by a variant of an executive agreement called a commu-
nique. These communiques have changed substantive United
States law2 36 and have resulted in congressional action attempting
to curtail further unilateral action by the Executive which would
affect the security of Taiwan. However, a recent communique by
President Reagan appears to have ignored this legislation.
The Executive maintains that the communique did not and has
not modified the terms of a statute enacted by Congress.2 37 The
analysis in this Comment, on the other hand, has attempted to
demonstrate that the President's communique is as effective as an
executive agreement and is an attempt to modify the statute.
The difficulty with the communique is not whether Taiwan
will receive the arms it needs for survival; most commentators
238
agree the President will continue to support the defense of Taiwan.
232. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
233. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
234. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
235. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953).
236. See supra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
237. 22 U.S.C.S. § 3301; see supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
238. Kilpatrick, On Taiwan, The President is Sincere--and Wrong, L.A. Times, Aug. 31,
1982 at 22 col. 2; see also China Hints Arms Sales to Taiwan, San Diego Union, March 11,
1984 at A8, col. 1. An unidentified spokesman quoted by the official Xinhua News Agency,
said China demanded that the U.S. government gradually reduce such sales (arms) to Tai-
wan, as it pledged to do on Aug. 17, 1982 agreement with Peking.
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The real problems are the possible international and domestic legal
effects which can result from such unilateral Executive action. The
Framers of the Constitution were explicit in their attempt to in-
hibit23 9 one branch of the government from having aristocratic con-
trol over our country's destiny. The growth in the number and
form of executive agreements demand a review of our constitu-
tional principles.
In today's fast paced international arena, the Executive must
have the ability to act swiftly and unilaterally. The Executive must
be able to negotiate and act as the "sole-organ" in this country's
foreign relations. However, absent congressional or constitutional
authorization, the Executive should not, and constitutionally does
not have the authority to unilaterally amend a statute enacted by
the people (Congress).
One solution to the present dilemma would be for Congress to
amend the TRA and delineate specific joint decision-making proce-
dures for the Executive to follow. However, this solution would not
alleviate the core problem of the "Executive aristocracy." A scena-
rio of the Congress and the Executive constantly usurping each
other's authority would be a futile exercise. President Carter's
communique, the subsequent legislation and now President Rea-
gan's action demonstrate the futility of this type of ping-pong for-
eign relations struggle.
This Comment suggests that either the Congress, as a body, or
an independent arms manufacturer bring this matter before the ju-
diciary for resolution. The position of the executive branch is tenu-
ous at best. Judicial precedent and constitutional principles would
present a strong case against the executive branch.
The term "Executive" is used because the real actor in this di-
lemma is not President Reagan, but rather, the executive branch
itself. For example, when questioned by a Congressman 240 regard-
ing the contradictions between the communique and the TRA, the
President stated that he was ". . . under the impression that this
communique was sent up to the White House from a lower level of
the State Department.
'241
Such a response highlights how the power of the Executive of-
239. See supra note 209.
240. Hearings, supra note 15 (statement by Rep. Soloman, Sept. 17, 1982). The Con-
gressman responded to the President by suggesting he ... send the communique back
down to the bowels of the State Department."
241. Id.
24
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fice can be manipulated by the executive branch and emphasizes
the need to restrict unilateral action by any one branch of our gov-
ernment. The judicial branch must be asked to intervene and reac-
quaint the executive branch with the axiom that the United States
is a democracy and not an aristocracy.
John E Wolfinger
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